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Summary  findings
Blunch and Verner analyze the determinants of earnings  They confirm their conjecture that there is an
in Ghanaian manufacturing, focusing on the impact of  asymmetry in the union relative wage effect: unions
unions in terms of the "union relative wage effect" and  benefit mainly at the lower end of the wage distribution.
the possible asymmetries of this effect across the earnings  This finding is in line with earlier research, which
distribution.  generally finds that unions reduce income inequality and
They find evidence of a union relative wage effect  wage discrimination.
occurring through  two distinct channels. First, there is a  An evaluation of the non-union subsample using the
direct effect through individual union membership, the  estimated union wage structure confirms the presence of
standard "union premium" well known from the  structural differences between the union and non-union
empirical literature on unions. Second, there is a  segments of Ghanaian manufacturing: for given
spillover effect to non-union  members. The authors  also  characteristics, a worker in the union sector earns more
find evidence of an additional union effect that comes  than a worker in the non-union sector.
through firm-specific training.
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1. Introduction
While the analysis of the determinants of earnings has been one of the success stories in
empirical  labor economics,  less  emphasis has  been placed  on the  interplay between
wages and institutional factors, such as labor unions, for example. This is particularly true
in  the case of Sub-Saharan African countries',  where  such analysis seems  especially
warranted as a basis  for policy proposals due to  formal sector jobs  being  scarce and
wages generally being low, in turn leading to both poverty and - due to the resulting low
tax-revenues  - a  low  level of  goods and  services from the public  sector.  The latter
precludes promoting education, i.e., building human capital, for the next generation to the
extent that is socially optimal.
The  experience  from  developed  economies  seems  to  suggest  that  unions  do
potentially furnish a mechanism for providing a positive environment by affecting labor
turnover and wage negotiation costs adversely, as well as promoting worker training,
increased worker  benefits and higher productivity, see Standing (1992). Hence, there
seems to be a scope for investigating the earnings determinants for developing economies
with  a  focus on the possible effects of unions in  greater detail, including a  study of
possible asymmetries across the earnings distribution.
See  however,  Rama  (1998)  who  analyzes  West-African  CFA (Communaute  Financiere  Africaine)
countries  and finds evidence  of unions  in the private  sector  being  more  instrumental  in creating  wage
moderation  than in creating  wage drift  in CFA countries.  Their  members  usually  get lower  wages  than
similar  nonunionized  workers,  which  the author  ascribes  to the subordinate  nature  of the labor  movement  in
CFA  countries.  Kristensen  and Verner  (1999) analyze  labor  market  distortions  in Cote  d'Ivoire and  find
evidence  of unions  affecting  wages  adversely  at the higher  quantiles  of the earnings  distribution,  which
seems  to agree  with the findings  of Rama  (1998). Schultz  and Mwabu  (1998)  analyze  labor  unions  and
their impact  on wages  and  employment  in South  Africa.  Among  the main findings  are that  wages  of union
members  of young  African  male workers  are 145  percent  higher  than  comparable  nonunion  workers  in the
bottom  decile  of the distribution  and 19  percent  higher  in  the top decile  of the wage  distribution.  It is
estimated  that if this large  union  relative  wage effect  were cut in half, the employment  of African  youth,
between  the ages  of 16 and  29, would  increase  by two percentage  points.
2This  paper  analyzes  earnings  determinants  in  the  Ghanaian  manufacturing
industries (food, wood, metal and textile), focussing on the impact of unions and the
possible  asymmetries  of  this  impact  across  the  earnings  distribution.  The  channels
through which we conjecture a potential union effect are twofold. First, we propose a
direct effect through individual union membership. This is the standard "union premium"
well known from the empirical literature on the so-called "union relative wage effect",
emerging with  Lewis  (1963).  However, this  does not  take  into account  the possible
spillover to  non-union  members  from unionism.  To  incorporate a  potential  spillover
effect, we allow unionism to potentially affect all workers, including a  sectoral union
density variable. In addition, we examine whether there may be an additional union effect
coming through via training, as proposed by, e.g., Booth and Chatterji (1998) and Booth,
Zoega and Francesconi (1999), since the union may promote training to  a degree over
and above that of management, due to, e.g., unions having a longer time horizon than
management, which may merely maximize profits and stock values in the short term. We
conjecture that the union effects are more likely to be present at the lower to medium
quantiles of the earnings distribution, since unions are generally seen as - and perceive
themselves  as  - proponents  of  workers'  rights  and  earnings  for  the  poorer  part  of
workers. Such a view would also be in line with previous research, which generally finds
that  unions  reduc'  income  inequality  and  wage  discrimination,  e.g.,  Panagides  and
Patrinos (1994).
WVhile  being  of  academic  interest  due  to  the  relative  skewness  in  earnings
determinants studies  since the majority of  studies concern  developed economies,  and
furthermore  do  so for the entire  wage  distribution, there  are  important policy  issues
involved as well. If unions  affect wages positively,  through the channels defined and
discussed above, then unions  should not necessarily be seen as obstacles to  economic
recovery  of  developing  countries.  Indeed,  unions  may  even  promote  a  positive
environment by affecting labor turnover and wage negotiation costs adversely, as well as
promoting  worker  training,  increased  worker  benefits  and  higher  productivity,  see
Standing (1992).
The main finding of the paper is a finding of distinct asymmetries in the effects of
unions across the wage distribution. The findings are consistent with a prior belief that
unions mainly bargain on behalf of the workers at the lower end of the wage distribution.
3Further,  we  find,  in  addition  to  a  direct  union  premium  related to  individual union
membership, an additional spillover effect to non-union members, coming through via
the degree of unionization of the sector. Lastly, we find an additional indirect union effect
coming through via training, interpretable as unions promoting training and being able to
bargain and subsequently share some of the rents obtained by firms with their members.
While  unions  generally  have  only  a  short and  controversial history  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa, due to the continent relying heavily on smallholder agriculture in addition to the
fact that unions are often prohibited by the national governments, the findings of this
study indicate a role for unions in Ghana as being ani  effective "voice" for workers, and,
possibly,  also  promoting  training  and  efficiency in  terms  of  lowering turnover  and
negotiation costs between workers and management (the data does not allow a rigorous
investigation of this latter issue, however).  Lastly, evaluating the non-union sub-sample
using the estimated union wage structure, i.e., "as if'  it was unionized, further establishes
the presence  of  structural  differences between  the union  and  non-union  part  of  the
Ghanaiani  manufacturing industry in that for given characteristics, a worker in the union
sector earns  more  than  a  worker  in  the non-union  sector.  This  finding  implies  the
existence of  structural  differences  between the  union  and  non-unionized  part  of the
manufacturing  sector,  i.e.,  that  unions  do  affect  wages  positively,  which  further
corroborates the previous findings.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the economic theory
underlying the analysis of trade unions, as well as a brief overview of the history of
unionism in Ghana. Then follows in section three a discussion of the methodology of this
paper, including the economic model, the econometric framework and data issues of this
study. An explorative descriptive analysis of the data set is performed in  section four,
which is then followed by the quantile regression analysis in section five. Section six
concludes and gives directions for further research.
2.  The Economics of the Trade Union and Empirical Evidence
In this subsection we review the theoretical framework for the analysis of the trade union
and provide a brief overview of the history of unionism in Ghana.
42.1  Theoretical Analysis of the Trade Union 2
A natural starting point in the analysis of unions would be to ask: "'what do unions do?"
(Freeman  and  Medoff;  1984).  The  answer  to  this  question  is  not  straightforward,
however. The theoretical literature traditionally states two main objectives of the union,
namely to  maximize (1) employment, and  (2) wages of union  members. Hence, here
already we see that the answer to "what do unions do?" is not clear-cut. Indeed, there is
an obvious trade-off at work between union objectives, since higher wages would seem to
bring about higher unemployment and vice versa, ceteris paribus 3. These objectives have
traditionally been taken as exogenously given in the literature, although some attempts
have been made to introduce endogenous elements. Most notably, the level of union-
membership has been argued to be an endogenous component of the union's  objective
function, due to unemployed members possibly leaving the union, see Pencavel (1991).
As a consequence of the union objectives as stated above, it follows that for the
forming of a union to be possible (unless maximization of members'  employment were
the exclusive objective), there must exist some rents in the product market(s) that can be
shared between the firm and the union, and, ultimately, the workers (note how this seems
to contradict the implication of perfect competition, under which a given firm earns zero
profits - or, alternatively, the firm's  production function exhibits decreasing returns to
labor in a neighborhood around the equilibrium 4). However, there may be a case for the
existence of unions generating the rents, which are subsequently shared with the union
members - this is something that we will return to later. Second, the union must have
some bargaining power that enables it to obtain part of these rents. When the union, i.e.
group of workers, is large or strong enough that a threat of strike is credible, it will have
the bargaining power that is necessary, but not sufficient, to obtain rents.  In addition,
namely, it is required that there be no or only minor alternative, i.e., unorganized, labor
available. Hence, the union must have some degree of monopoly power in the supply of
labor. Ultimately, when an entire sector is organized, a "closed shop" arrangement is said
to be effective in the sector in question.
2 This  sub-section  relies  heavily  on Booth  (1995).
3 Naturally,  the tradeoff  depends  on the elasticity  of the demand  for labor  in the sector  of interest:  the more
elastic  is labor  demand,  the larger  the "price"  in terms of increased  unemployment  for an increase  in wage
demands.  Similarly,  the more  inelastic  is labor demand  in a given sector,  the smaller  the loss in terms of
unemployment.
4 See  Ulph  and Ulph  (1990).
5Once in place, the existence of the union has several potential  effects. First, the
union may impose allocative costs through the distortion of factor prices, coming about
through the increase of wages over and above what they would otherwise have been. In
the absence of unions, allocative efficiency comes about as an  allocation of  identical
factor inputs such that their marginal products are equalized across sectors. However,
when unions are present, the wages of the unionized sector(s) is higher, relative to the
non-unionized,  which,  in turn,  leads to  an  employment level  in  the unionized  sector
below what it would otherwise have been. Next,  this results in an influx into the non-
unionized sector of formerly organized workers, in turn adversely affecting the wages in
this sector.
Unions may also bring about technical inefficiencies. This is so, since in addition to
the level of wages, the unions may also affect the restrictive practices of an industry, such
as manning agreements or rules about work pace. Additional adverse effects on output
may come about if the strike threat is actually carried out (and substitution with non-
organized labor is not possible or limited).
Note, however, that while the above discussion implicitly assumes perfect markets
(prior  to  the emergence  of  the  union),  there  exist  considerable evidence  that  many
product markets  are characterized by  imperfect competition,  arising from  bargaining
power of labor due to specific training, mobility costs, and/or hiring and firing costs. For.
example, Stewart (1990) finds in an analysis of British data that only five percent of the
establishments for which there is a positive and statistically significant union-non union
wage differential operate in competitive product market conditions. In this case, it is not
certain whether the replacement of individual bargaining with collective bargaining will
bring about additional inefficiencies or, rather, reduce the preexisting inefficiencies. This
brings us to the second of the "two faces" of unionism, in Freeman and Medoff s (1979)
terminology: there is a potential for positive  effects coming about as a consequence of
unionism. Hence, rather than merely obtaining part of an already existing surplus, a union
may be able to generate a surplus. First, it may act as an information provider, sharing
information on workers' preferences for wages, personnel practices and so on between
workers and management, information which may not otherwise have been shared. The
reason for this is that while each individual may fear retaliation from management from
expressing an opinion, a collection of workers - in a union - may not. Hence, the union
6may act as the workers' "voice", Hirschman (1970). Second, the existence of unions may
work as a "pool" of labor, in turn resulting in lower turnover and negotiating costs, since
management now only needs to employ centralized bargaining, which is less costly than
bargaining  with  each  worker  individually.  Obviously,  a  crucial  factor  in  a  union's
recognition  as  an  efficiency-enhancing  factor  will  depend  on  the  extent  to  which
continuity in the employment relationship is desirable.
In particular, it has been argued that union organization is more likely, the more
workers are trained in firm-specific skills, see Williamson (1985). In this case, the worker
and the firm share the costs of capital-accumulation and both are similarly interested in
maintaining  a  long-term  relationship  in  which  the  returns  from  the  human  capital
investments can be enjoyed, see Becker (1962). Booth and Chatterji (1998) analyze the
optimal  level  of  training,  when  training  comprises  both  general  and  firm-specific
elements  in  a  theoretical  model.  They  find  that  the  existence  of  local  union-firm
bargaining ensures that the post-training wage is set sufficiently high so as to minimize
the number of quits considerably below what it would be in the absence of unions, in turn
increasing the level of training provided by the firm. This analysis is consistent with the
stylized  fact  that  unions are  associated with  lower  turnover  and more-firm  provided
training, see, e.g.  Booth, Zoega and Francesconi (1999). Hence, in addition to a direct
wage effect coming through via unions'  bargaining power, we may a priori expect an
additional  effect  from  unionization  coming  about  via  (firm-specific)  training.  An
investigation of whether this lends support to the Ghanaian experience, will be one of the
main topics of the empirical analysis below.
The discussion above is what underlies the notion of the so-called "union relative
wage  effect",  originating with the seminal  work by Lewis  (1963). Lewis  defines the
union-nonunion wage differential ("the union relative wage effect") as:
Wiu  _  Wn
W.n
Hence, referring to  the above discussion, the possible existence and magnitude of the
wage differential will depend on the extent to which the union is able to affect the wages
of  members  relative  to  the  wages  of  nonmembers,  e.g.,  through  bargaining,  at one
7extreme, where the union through its bargaining power merely extracts and subsequently
shares already existing rents (in the form of profits) of the firm with its members, to the
other extreme, where the union generates rents through its potential adverse effects on
labor-turnover and  costs  of  wage-negotiations between  management  and  workers (in
reality, however, rather than any one of these two "pure" cases, it is likely that what we
will see in reality is a combination of these to effects). However, as to the exact empirical
implementation of this notion of a union relative wage effect, the theory is silent. This is
left  to  the  researcher,  and  there  are  several possibilities,  with  their  advantages  and
disadvantages, as we shall see in the discussion on econometric methodology below.
2.2.  A Brief Overview of the History of Unionism in Ghana
Most  Sub-Saharan  economies  are  dominated  by  smallholder  agriculture,  which,
combined with the fact that many Sub-Saharan African governments historically have
effectively prohibited independent trade unions, has led to unionism being low or even
absent in many countries of the continent. Ghana, however, has a long tradition for labor
unions, originating with the many guilds and artisans' associations in the early nineteenth
century in what was then the Gold Coast, Gray (1981). The origin of guilds and artisans
led naturally  to  an  organization  of  labor according  to  the  field  of  work,  e.g.,  into
industrial and commercial workers, mineworkers, public service workers, teachers and
educational workers, maritime and dock-workers, and so on, just as is common in most
developed  economies.  The  potential  synergies  between  the  labor  movement  and
government were already realized early, even before Ghana's  independence in 1957. In
1930, Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb) noted in a dispatch that "regulation of wage laborer
organizations was of importance, and that colonial governments should act to facilitate
the passage of unions into constitutional channels", Gray (1981).
This early sign of recognition and potential desirability of more organized labor
organizations was further strengthened following the cocoa boycott in 1937-38, which led
to the forming of the Department of Labor - clearly a sign of the initial importance given
to  labor issues in  Ghana. With the enactment of the Trade Union Ordinance in  1941,
unions got the  first  official endorsement. Being the Ghana-specific part  of the more
general (in a geographical sense, being for all the British colonies) Colonial Development
Act from the year before, this ensured that Ghana (just like any other British territory)
8could not receive help under the law unless it had in place legislation, which protected the
rights of trade unions. A major driving force behind the  1941 law, according to Gray
(1981, p. 14) was an "unmistakable desire of the British to build up the unions and to use
them in order to rationalize labor relations, reduce strikes and absenteeism, and increase
efficiency". Clearly, these points  accord well with  the (potential) workings of unions,
which have become a standard part of the theoretical literature on unions, as discussed in
the previous discussion.
The seminal legislation fused a rapid growth of labor organizations in Ghana: by
the end of 1942, four unions had been registered - by 1946, this number was increased by
another twenty unions. In  1945, 14 of these unions were  gathered in  the Gold Coast
Trade Union Congress, known as the TUC, accounting for around 5,000 of the organized
labor in Ghana, a number which  subsequently increased rapidly (to almost 11,000 the
year  after).  This  has  since  been  expanded  with  numerous  unions  formed  by  the
employees of several government departments and private enterprises and is today the
mother organization of Ghanaian trade unions.
Following the increase in trade unions and the increased pressure on employers,
employers  also  started  to  organize  themselves,  "it  is  significant  that  the  earliest
permanent employers'  group, the  Chamber of Mines,  appeared in  an  industry with  a
strong union",  Gray (1981).  Hence, it may be  claimed that the  emergence of unions
helped generate a more dynamic environment on the labor market, where management
and workers could meet and exchange ideas, thus increasing efficiency in production..
The formation of the first umbrella organization of employers came with the inauguration
of the Ghanaian Federation of Industries, which later lead to the founding of the larger
and more permanent organization, The Ghana Employers'  Association (GEA) in  1959.
The GEA and the TUC were mainly brought together by collective bargaining, but later
they expanded their relations and activities, meeting to discuss problems of development
and additional ways of future cooperation. A very concrete example of the developing
relations between  workers'  (TUC)  and employers'  (GEA) organizations is the  Labor
Advisory Council, which was a body specified in both the 1958 and 1965 labor laws. The
Council was originally created to advise the Department of Labor and became a  very
important forum for exchanges between management and unions, both of which had an
equal representation of seven members in the Council.
9The Industrial Relations Act of 1958 was a major breakthrough for the organization
of labor. It secured bargaining guarantees for the unions in that it allowed extension of
collective agreements, by administrative action, to workplaces where employees do "the
same kind of work" as those already covered by agreement, but whose employers were
reluctant to negotiate, thus, in effect, "forcing" reluctant management to the negotiating
table or, if not, at least to acknowledge existing agreements. Notably, the effect is very
clear in the data. Considering data from 1959 to 1977, Gray (1981) notes that the number
of new agreements signed increased dramatically following The Industrial Relations Act
of  1958. Starting with  3 new  agreements signed in the period  1959-60, in  1977 the
number of new agreements signed was 57 (with a peak of 66 in  1976). Similarly, the
number of total agreements in force exploded as well. Starting with 21 in 1959-60, the
number of total agreements in force increased to 180 in 1977.
So what has been the effect of the increase of unionism in Ghana? Gray (1981)
suggests that unions have been helpful in decreasing the number of strikes. Analyzing
data on the number of work stoppages and man-days lost from 1945 to 1976, Gray finds
that  "against a background of increasing union membership, the number of strikes is
remarkably consistent and, in fact, surprisingly low, given the rising worker expectations
prior  to  independence and  the unstable economic conditions after  1965". This points
towards unions having played an active and positive role in the economic development of
Ghana.
Following the economic breakdown  of the Ghanaian economy  in  1983, the so-
called Economic Restructuring Program (ERP) was initiated by the Ghanaian government
in collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank. One of the measures taken was a
permanent  layoff of 20,000  public workers from  the "notoriously  overstaffed Cocoa
Board", Nelson (1991), which was however, followed by an equivalent of roughly two
years'  total  compensation. Note  that  this  seems to  indicate a concern  of wages  over
employment, at least for public workers'  unions. This conclusion seems in line with the
events in  1986, where the government announced an abolishment of leave allowances,
which was a benefit that  substantially supplemented low public-sector wages. Unions
threatened with strikes, leading to the government reversing its decision and revising the
1986 budget, so that the allowances were no longer abolished. Also, between 1984 and
1991, the minimum wage had risen by more than 1200 percent as a result of bargaining
10between TUC, GEA and the government. All of these events hint at the bargaining power
of Ghanaian unions being substantial.
There are examples of an even more active and direct influence of unions in Ghana.
Vormawor and Awuku-Apaw (1996) report a program run by The General Agricultural
Workers'  Union (GAWU) in small villages in the Greater Accra Region in which rural
workers have been organized into farming units and provided with education on issues
such as grain storage, community afforestation, bee-keeping and the processing of gari (a
local  staple food).  As  a  second example of  non-traditional union roles,  the  GPRTU,
which  is  comprised  of  commercial vehicle  owners,  drivers  and  their  assistants,  is
responsible for vehicle safety and the collection of taxes for local and other government
agencies, as well as checking over-speeding and the use of fire extinguishers by drivers.
Further, they help financing vehicles for members, Panford (1998). All of this implies
that  the  workings  of  Ghanaian  unions  may  potentially  go  above  and  beyond  the
"traditional" wage/employment bargaining, affecting the wider economy, including the
environment (however, the dataset applied in this paper does not allow us to go further
into non-pecuniary issues of unionism in Ghana).
3.  Methodology
This section preseiAts  a discussion of methodological issues involved in this  study. We
start with a discussion of the economic model underlying the analysis, and then discuss
how to estimate this model, specifically aiming at incorporating the possibility of a union
relative  wage  effect.  Lastly,  we  discuss  data  related  issues,  focussing  on  how  to
incorporate unionism as an explanatory variable in the analysis of wage determinants.
3.1  Economic Model
The theoretical framework for the analysis is standard human capital theory;  see,  for
example, Becker (1975) and Mincer (1974), where an individual builds up knowledge
and  skills  via  education  and  experience  (specific  on-the-job,  as  well  as  general
experience). According  to  the theory,  individuals  are  then subsequently rewarded  in
terms of higher earnings according to the level of accumulated human capital. Formally,
11the economic model may be derived from the theory of individual demand for schooling,
which viewed education as an investment in human capital, Becker (1975).5
Following this view, an individual will invest in education up to the point where the
marginal benefit  from  an additional year of schooling equals the marginal cost  of an
additional year  of  schooling 6. In the traditional human  capital literature  earnings are
determined by education and other individual characteristics. However, since our dataset
allows  inclusion  of  union  and  firm  level  variables  as  well,  the  standard Mincerian
earnings function is augmented with union and firm level characteristics, resulting in the
following simple model:
We=  W(Ij,  Fi, Uj)  (2)
where  W (wages) of individual i is the dependent variable, I is a vector of individual
characteristics; for  example age and  age squared, the  latter to  capture possible  non-
linearities, proxying  general  experience;  tenure  in  the  firm,  capturing  firm-specific
experience; the level of education and gender. F is a vector of characteristics for the firm
of individual i, for example the size of the firm (proxied by the number of employees)
and geographical location. U is a vector of variables capturing possible union effects for
individual i,  for example union  membership and/or union  density of the firm  or the
sector.
3.2  Econometric Framework
The estimation method applied in this paper is quantile regression analysis. This method
allows the marginal effects for different quantiles (where the quantile of interest may be
chosen  arbitrarily)  of  the  dependent  variable  to  be  estimated  simultaneously,  thus
exploring the entire conditional distribution. By allowing the parameter estimates for the
marginal  effects  of  the  explanatory variables  to  differ  across  the  quantiles  of  the
5 While  for developed  economies  the investment  decision  may be viewed  as a decision  of the individual
due to the existence of widespread  subsidies  to education  and relatively  less pooling of resources, for
developing  economies  the relevant  decision  unit may  be the household.  However,  we will not go into these
issues  in this study.  See Khandker,  Lavy  and  Filmer (1994)  and Mason  and Khandker  (1997)  for a detailed
description  of a household  decision  model.
12dependent  variable,  robustness  to potential  heteroscedasticity  is achieved  as a result. This
contrasts with the  widely used Ordinary Least Squares regression, which requires
homoscedasticity  (indeed, in  the  bulk of  the  empirical literature, the  presence of
homoscedasticity  is merely a maintained  hypothesis).
The method, however,  has virtues  other than being robust to heteroscedasticity,.
When  the error terms are non-normal,  for instance,  quantile  regression  estimators  may be
more efficient than least squares estimators.  Furthermore,  since the quantile  regression
objective  function  is a weighted  sum of absolute  deviations,  one obtains  a robust  measure
of location and, as a consequence,  the estimated coefficient  vector is not sensitive to
extreme observations  on the dependent  variable. The main advantage,  though, is the
semi-parametric  nature of the approach,  which relaxes the restrictions  on the parameters
to be constant  across the entire distribution  of the dependent  variable. For our purposes,
in particular,  we would a priori expect the union  relative wage effect  to differ across  the
wage distribution,  since unions would seem to be bargaining  mainly on behalf of the
workers  at the lower end of the wage  distribution.  Further,  it seems  likely that the returns
to education,  tenure, or other relevant  observable  variables  would differ across  the wage
distribution.  For example, we may conjecture  that education will be a more important
determinant  at the higher quantiles,  relative  to the lower  quantiles.
Formally the  method, first developed by Koenker and Basset (1978), can  be
formulated  as:
Y, = Xji  /3  +  u  = Quante  (Yi  I Xi) = Xi  3e  (3)
where Quant, 9(Y, I  X,)  denotes  the Oth  conditional  quantile  of Y given  X for individual  i.
In general,  the Oih  sample  quantile (0 < 9 < 1) of Y solves:
min  =  I{  E  | Y, - x;p  I +  E  (I - ) I  Y, - X;fl}  (4)
,8  n  ,r, 2X;  8:X;08
6 This implicitly assumes perfect information of the household decision maker, as well as perfect capital
markets,  both of which are very restrictive  and, likely, unrealistic  assumptions  in the case of developing
13Buchinsky (1995) examines various estimators for the asymptotic covariance matrix and
concludes that the design matrix bootstrap performs the best. In this paper, the standard
errors are obtained by bootstrapping using 200 repetitions, in line with the literature.
In addition to the quantile regression analysis, we will also estimate the mean logarithmic
union-nonunion wage differential (or, similarly, the wage  gap). Following Hirsch and
Addison (1986), the wage equation  is estimated for the union 7 and non-union  sector
separately, thus estimating:
lIwn= Xnpn  +  ,n
lnW,u =X7i",. + e'  (6)
where subscripts n and u indicate the "non-union" and "union" sectors, respectively. The
mean logarithmic union-nonunion wage differential (or, similarly, wage gap) is estimated
as:8
d = (/Au-/in)  )X)
The wage differential may be evaluated at either the mean characteristics of the workers
from the union or non-union sub-sample or from the full sample. We choose to evaluate
the wage gap/wage differential at the mean characteristics of the full sample, since this, in
effect, amounts to asking: "What is the predicted wage differential between working in
the union and non-union sectors for a worker with average characteristics?", Hirsch and
Addison (1986).
economies.
7 We define  the union  sector  as the collection  of firms,  for which  at least one worker  is a member  of a
union. Similarly,  the nonunion  sector consists  of all firms,  where  no workers  are organized  in a labor  union.
Had we conditioned  on individual  union  membership  instead,  we would  implicitly  have  assumed  no
spillover  effects  to the wages  of non-union  members  (at the firm  level  - note that  since  there are organized
workers  in all four sectors,  we cannot  use  the sectoral  union  ndensity  variable  to discriminate  between  the
union  and non-union  sectors  since  then, in effect,  we would  operate  with  the union sector,  only).
F The  wage gap  may be converted  into a percentage  value  by applying  the formula:
wage gap in percent = (I -ed ).100
where  e is the exponential  function,  see Halvorsen  and Palmquist  (1980).
14Next, we may test whether the union relative wage effect is statistically significant by
combining  the  estimated  union  wage  structure  and  the  characteristics  of  non-union
members, hence estimating:
In  W, = X7,fl  (8)
i.e., the wages of non-union  members are predicted "as if'  they were  subject to  the
estimated union wage structure, i.e., to the returns to individual and firm characteristics
prevailing  in  the  unionized  sector.  Once  estimated,  we  may  then  test  whether  the
predicted wages from (8) are statistically different from the actual wages of non-union
workers using a standard t-test. We will take rejection of the null-hypothesis of equality
of the two wage series as implying structural differences between the union  and non-
unionized part of the manufacturing sector, i.e., that unions do affect wages positively. 9
3.3  Data Issues
The data are from the Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED), a survey
carried out by the University of Ghana, the Centre for the Study of African Economies
(University  of  Oxford)  and  the  Overseas  Development  Administration  (London)  in
collaboration witn the World Bank in  1994. The survey covers 215 firrms in Ghanaian
manufacturing (consisting of the four sectors wood, food, metal and textiles), from each
of which a sample of up to ten workers were interviewed, leading to a total sample of 215
firms  and  1206  workers  (however,  there  is  a  substantial  dropout  due  to  missing
observation, leading to an effective estimation sample of 683 workers).
The main variables of the survey applied in this  study include a  "core"  of (log)
monthly  wages  and  the  standard human  capital  variables: age  (to  capture  potential
general experience), tenure in the firm (to capture potential specific experience), highest
level of education, training variables, as well as occupational control variables and firm
9 Our alternative  hypothesis  is
In Wi  > Win
This yields  a test with  more  power  than the two-sided  alternative.
15level control variables, most notably size 10 of the firm in terms of employees. Regarding
the issue of the possible existence of union relative wage effects, as discussed previously,
this may be measured in various ways. There are two dimensions involved here. First,
how do we conjecture the channel through which the union impacts wages: is there an
individual, direct effect through  individual union membership  (the approach taken in,
e.g., Beaudry and  Sowa (1994) or  is there  instead (or  potentially) an  indirect effect
through  the degree  of unionization at an  establishment or  in an  industry (this  is  the
approach taken by, e. g., Maloney and Ribeiro; 1999), as this is viewed as proxying the
bargaining power of a union within an industry, thus allowing spillovers to non-union-
members? (if such spillovers exist, and are not taken into account, it will likely lead to an
upwards bias in the estimated premium to individual union membership). We choose to
let this be  an  empirical question (this was suggested to  us by Donald Parsons), thus
including both a dummy variable for individual union membership, as well as a sectoral
union density variable, noting that collinearity is not likely to be a serious problem, as
these two union variables are only weakly correlated (having a simple correlation of 0.08,
whereas the individual union membership and firm union density variables have a simple
correlation of  0.76,  hence including both  of  the latter in  the  same regression  would
potentially cause serious collinearity problems 11).
However, potentially there may still be an endogeneity related to the use  of the
variable of individual union membership. Following the approach taken in Schultz and
Mwabu (1998) we  will  suffice it to  say  that  it is  beyond  the  scope of  our  data  to
endogenize union membership, including explaining who gets a union job and who does
not, as well as the extent to which unions enhance the productivity of workers with the
same observable characteristics. As a result, any estimated union relative wage effects
may overstate or understate the "true" union relative wage effect.
In the other dimension  is the  issue of how to  define the unionized  sector. One
approach  has  been to  simply measure  the  impact  of  unionism  at the  mean  of  the
10  It appears  to be a well-established  fact  that larger  establishments  pay  higher  wages  than smaller
establishments,  ceteris  paribus;  see,  e. g., Schaffner  (1998)  and Velenchik  (1997).
1 Maloney  and Ribeiro  (1999)  suggest  including  the union  density  variable  at thefirm level  as a proxy  for
the bargaining  power  of the union over  the firm's rents.  However,  with  a high correlation  between  this and
the dummy  variable  for individual  union  membership,  inclusion  of both would  likely  yield  problems  with
multi  collinearity,  and hence, it is not valid  to simultaneously  "allow"  the two different  channels  of a union
16characteristics of the sample, i.e. by merely including a dummy variable for whether an
individual was unionized  or  not,  and  then  interpret the  possible  significance  of  the
parameter  estimate  of  this  as  a  union  premium.  This  approach  is  not  entirely
unproblematic, however. The omission of any variables influencing wage determination
that are positively (negative) correlated with the union variable will cause the estimated
coefficient on the union variable to  be upward (downward) biased, since the estimate
coefficient picks up the effect from the omitted variable/factor, as well.
For example, we may conjecture that non-union jobs are typically found in smaller
establishments/sectors, since it takes a certain size for an establishment or sector to  be
"interesting" for a union, in terms of potential members. Hence, failure to control for firm
size may cause upwards bias in the union premium (however, the present dataset allows
us to incorporate firm size as an explanatory variable). Further, in line with our previous
discussion, it  may be  conjectured  that firns  that have  become  unionized respond  to
unionization by carefully vetting  prospective new workers in  order to  employ higher
quality workers even more so than before, due to the increased wage demands. And since
"quality"  is  unmeasurable,  we  may,  again, get  upwards  bias  in  the  union  premium
estimates. The same applies to the labor turnover argument of unions: if unions reduce
labor  turnover,  and  this  effect  cannot  be  directly  observed  and/or  included  as  an
explanatory variable,  the  result  is,  once again,  upwards  bias  in  the  union  premium
estimate.
One solution, if having a panel data set, is to extract the individual fixed effect of
the data, thus mitigating the potential bias. If, however, one has a cross-section data set
(as we have), an alternative to letting the union effect becaptured by a dummy variable in
an  estimation  for the  full  sample is  to  split the  sample  in  two,  thus  estimating  the
marginal returns to the explanatory variables in the union and non-union sector separately
and calculating the union premium as the differential between these two sets of estimates,
evaluated at the mean of the sample. For completeness, and since the former approach
has been widely used in the literature, we will pursue both approaches in our analysis.
relative  effect  (direct/individual  and  indirect/spillover,  respectively)  that  we  propose.  This  is the  reason
behind  our  estimated  model  taking  the  form  it does.
174. Descriptive Analysis
In this section we will perform a very brief descriptive analysis of the data set. This
is mainly so as to motivate the more rigorous econometric analysis in the next section.
Turning first to (log) wages, we note from the table in Appendix B that the mean of
wages in the non-union sample (as defined in the previous discussion, see above) is lower
than that of the union subsample, pointing towards unions being a major component in
the wage  determination process,  possibly  through  bargaining  over  firm rents  and/or
through  adversely affecting labor turnover and wage negotiating costs  and increasing
productivity, as  previously discussed.  Further,  we  note that  the  wages  of the  union
subsample fluctuates less than that of the non-union sector, in line with previous research
finding that unions tend to generally decrease wage inequality, Standing (1992).
Somewhat puzzling, 16 percent of the union sample consist of managers, while this
is only 8 percent in the non-union sample (as compared to 12 percent in the full sample).
While production workers seem to be more represented in the non-unionized sample (63
percent vs. 42 percent) the opposite is the case for administrative staff, where in the non-
union subsample 17 percent are from this occupational category, and only 9 percent in
the non-unionized sample. While one may a priori expect the production workers to be
the most heavily unionized occupational category, we know from the review of unionism
in Ghana in section 2.1 that unionism is widespread across virtually all occupations and
sectors.
Surprisingly, most of the sample as well as the two subsamples has a permanent
contract. Hence, including this as an explanatory variable may a priori appear fruitless
due to the low variation in contract status. However, there may be a possibility of an
indirect effect coming about via training, hence we propose interacting the variable for
contract status with training (and since only around 30 percent of the sample has both a
permanent contract and received training, this will likely yield some explanatory power
due to the higher variation in this interacted variable).
A substantial fraction, 30 percent of the workers, are members of a labor union, so
there is at least a potential of discovering a union relative wage effect coming through via
individual union membership.  Turning to  the unionized  sub-sample, we note that  60
percent of the workers of unionized firms are members of a union, leaving 40 percent of
workers in the unionized sector as not being members of a trade union. The latter would
18seem (since 40 percent is a substantial fraction) to make a case for investigating whether
there is a spillover effect to wages of non-organized workers in the unionized sector, also.
This issue is further explored in the econometric analysis of the next section.
In  addition  to  this  more descriptive  evidence of possible  structural  differences
between the union and nonunion sectors, we also provide a more rigorous test of whether
such structural differences exist. This  is done by applying the Mann-Whitney test for
equality of two distributions, here, the union and  non-union subsamples. For the vast
majority of the variables, equality of the distributions of the union and non-union samples
can be rejected. This points towards the existence of strong structural differences between
the  union  and  non-union  part  of  the  Ghanaian  manufacturing  sector.  In  turn,  this
motivates the more rigorous econometric analysis of union relative wage effects in  the
next section.
5.  Union Relative Wage Effects and Union Membership in Ghana: Findings from
the Econometric Analysis
In this section, we present and discuss the main findings of the empirical analysis. Our
main  focus  is  on  union  relative  wage  effects  (see  the  Appendices  for  a  complete
presentation of all the findings).
Analysis  of  Wage  Determinants,  Full  Sample  with  Union  Dummy  and  Density
Variables Included
The first specification allows simultaneously for the union relative wage effect coming
through via two  distinct  channels, namely  individual union  membership  and  sectoral
union density, the latter allowing for a possible spill-over effect to non-members. The
first  thing we  note  is the  very  strong difference between  the OLS  and  the  quantile
findings, see Appendix Cl.  Whereas the concave shape of the life-earnings profile that is,
by now, considered a stylized fact in the literature, is apparent in the OLS findings (since,
although the quadratic term is "zero" for practical purposes, it is statistically significantly
different from zero, due to an extremely low standard error on the estimate) this is not so
when considering the quantile regression findings (although the age term is borderline
significant for the median regression).
19A second important discovery is the overwhelming statistical significance of all of
the educational dummies when considering the OLS-regression findings. This contrasts
with the quantile regression findings, which reveal that for the lowest quantile, there is no
premium for  education, except for professional education. The number of statistically
significant educational earnings premiums increase when moving up along the earnings
distribution, which seems in line with a conjecture of education being more important for
the individuals in the higher end of the earnings distribution, since these jobs often times
require more academic  skills than the (often unskilled) jobs  at the lower  end of  the
earnings distribution.
Firm size consistently affects wages positively, both in the OLS-regression as well
as in all the quantile regressions.'2 An explanation for this could be an efficiency-wage
argument, coupled with the monitoring costs of larger establishments, according to which
higher wages leads to  workers using more effort. And, since the costs of monitoring
workers would seem to be larger, the larger the establishment, this effect should increase
with firm size, as well.
There do not seem to be any substantial direct effects from tenure or from having a
permanent contract, the latter being in line with the fact that the number of workers in the
formal sector in Ghana is quite small, hence workers do not require compensation for
permanent employment, they merely want to obtain formal sector employment in the first
place. Also, the impact from training is negative. One interpretation is that workers carry
the  cost  of  the  training  themselves,  and  then  later  may  receive  a  return  from  the
investment (however, we cannot determine the timing of training and hence a possible
future positive impact on earnings from the data alone).
However, there is a positive and statistically significant effect coming through from
being both on a permanent contract and having been trained in the firm. This seems to
indicate that once a worker is on a permanent contract and the firm has considered it
"worthwhile"  to  let the  worker undergo training,  then there  is  a positive  return. An
interpretation of this is that the prospect of the returns from the investment in training
being shared by the worker and the firm in the future (due to the permanence of the
12 This is in line  with previous  research,  e.g., Schaffner  (1998)  and Velenchik  (1997),  who both  find
evidence  of larger  establishments  paying  higher  wages,  ceteris  paribus.
20contractual relationship'3)  leads the firm to carry some of the costs, i.e., changing the
premium from being negative to being positive.
Moving  to  the  findings  that  represent  our  main  interest,  we  note  the  strong
asymmetry  in  the  union  premium.  The  direct  effect,  coming  through  via  union
membership of the individual, is positive and significant for only the lower part of the
distribution, confirming our conjecture that unions are mainly the "voice" for the workers
at the lower end of the earnings distribution, typically low skilled workers. In addition to
this, there is an extra union membership effect coming through via training. This seem.s  to
indicate that unions increase training, or, at the least, the returns to training. This finding
is  in  line with,  e.g.,  Booth  and  Chatterji (1998)  and  Booth,  Zoega and  Francesconi
(1999). The  union  density  of the  sector does  not  seem to  influence wages  directly,
indicating lack of a direct spillover effect to non-union members. However, there seems
to  exist an indirect  spillover effect,  coming through  via training: when the worker  is
trained,  the degree  of  unionization  in  the  sector affects  individual wages positively,
hinting at unions' bargaining power being able to extract some of the rents from training
from the firm and subsequently sharing it with members. This effect persists at the higher
end of the wage distribution, as well. Note that had we relied on the OLS-estimates only,
we would have concluded the presence of only the indirect spillover effect, and thus, no
direct effects from union membership. Clearly, this finding substantiates the importance
and potential power of the quantile regression approach as an alternative, or, at least, a
complement to the more traditional OLS-based analysis. From the t-tests of equality of
coefficients  across  quantiles  in  Appendix  D,  we  note  that  the  hypothesis  of  equal
coefficients is rejected for several of the variables. Once again, this points towards the
appropriateness of the quantile regression approach.
Analysis of Wage Determinantsfor  Unionized And Non-Unionized  Forms Separately
As noted in the earlier discussion, there are potential problems with the above approach.
It can lead to bias, and, hence, lead to invalid conclusions with respect to the potential
'3 Note  that  this would  hold  even in the case  of an informal  contractual  relationship,  in which  the terms of
the contract  will  never be legally  enforced.  This  is so, since  even  an implicit  contract  will generally  be
adhered  to by the parties, due  to norms  , social  conventions  of the society,  and  so on. Hence,  the actual
terms  of the contract  are not necessarily  of relevance  per se. This  was pointed  out to us by Donald  Parsons
in a private  discussion.
21impact from unions in terms of a "union relative wage-effect". One way of dealing with
this is to estimate the regressions for the union and non-union sectors separately if the
data so allows: previously, it was rather unusual to have matched employer-employee
data  sets.  Hence, when  estimating  the regression  for the "union  sector",  one had  to
condition on individual union membership, hence the resulting two estimation samples
would be of union and non-union members rather than the union and non-union sectors.
Again, this implicitly omits any potential for a spillover effect to non-union members,
and thus, would likely lead to an upward bias in the estimated union premium. Since we
have firm data also, we split the sample into unionized and non.-unionizedfirms (since all
of our four sectors have some union members, we cannot split across this dimension). To
operationalize this, we let a firm be in the unionized sector if it had at least one worker
that states individual union membership, otherwise they were taken to be non-unionized.
Hence, we allow for spillover effects to non-union members within the firm. Again, the
findings from these regressions are too numerous to go through  in detail so we will,
again, highlight the most  important findings; see Appendices C2 and C3  for the full
results.
The first thing that begs recognition is the difference in the relative importance of
the education variables as a wage determinant. In the non-unionized  sector, education
(apart from professional and university education) seems to be generally less important as
a wage promoting factor, whereas formal education is a very important wage generating
factor  in  the  unionized  sector,  especially  at  the  medium  to  high  quantiles.  One
interpretation of this is that unions manage to force management to acknowledge formal
education, possibly to an extent that may be out of line with productivity (judging from
the fact that education has virtually no role to play in the non-unionized sector, i.e., in the
absence of unions). However, it might equally well be a result of unions being able to
extract  and  share  the  rents  with  members,  with  relative  weights  according  to  their
educational levels, since in the absence of unions, workers are likely to be weak  and
without the bargaining power necessary to voice their demands.
Another thing to note is the fact that discrimination (favoring male workers) while
being present in the non-unionized sector - as indicated by the strong significance of the
gender dummy at the low and  middle quantiles - is virtually absent in the unionized
sector, since the gender dummy is only weakly statistically significant and only at the
22median.  This  points  to  unions  being  important promoters of  workers'  rights  among
genders, i.e. among the workers themselves. This finding is in line with, e.g., Panagides
and Patrinos (1994).
The last thing we will note is the higher importance of permanent contracts in the
unionized sector as compared to the non-unionized sector, since the "permanent contract"
indicator variable is positive and statistically significant at five percent for all quantiles
(as  well as  OLS)  in unionized  firms,  whereas  it is  only marginally  significant (and
negative) at the median only in the non-unionized sub-sample. Again, this points towards
the unions being able to bargain on behalf of workers who have committed themselves
(or been offered) to working for the firm in the long term, although they themselves are
not  able to  achieve recognition due to  the small  size of the  formal sector, and thus,
resulting high competition among workers for formal sector jobs.  To the union, also, it
seems more fruitful to bargain on behalf of the more permanently attached workers, since
they are the ones more likely to also work in the future, and, hence, to remain members of
the union (and note that these findings occur despite the fact that most workers have a
permanent contract, as discussed earlier).'4
We also calculate the union  premium; this  is calculated as the difference in the
(OLS) parameter estimates for the unionized and non-unionized sub-samples, evaluated
at the mean of the full sample, following Booth (1995). We note that, in line with our
previous discussion, there is a positive premium to women from being employed in the
unionized  sector (around five percent),  as is also the case for permanently employed
workers (around 85 percent).  Lastly - referring to equation (8) above - evaluating the
non-union  sub-sample using  the  estimated  union  wage  structure,  i.e.,  "as  if'  it was
unionized,  further establishes the presence of structural differences between the union
and  non-union  sections  of  the  Ghanaian  manufacturing  industry  in  that  for  given
characteristics, a worker in the union sector earns more than a worker in the non-union
sector for "not unreasonable" levels of significance, i.e. above 7.5 percent.'5 This finding
14 The  cynic,  however,  may  claim  that  the  union  in this  case  manages  to obtain  wage  gains  for  its members,
which  are  unwarranted  in a productivity  and/or  efficiency  sense,  since  most  workers  are  on a permanent
contract,  anyway.
15 This  conclusion  is reached  by performing  a standard  t-test  for a null-hypothesis  of equality  between  the
estimated  union  wages  and  actual wages  of non-union  workers,  with  the alternative  hypothesis  being that
the estimated  wage is greater  than the actual  wage. The  t-statistic  is 1.445,  which  has a p-value  of 0.075.
23indicates  the existence  of structural  differences  between  the union and non-unionized  part
of the manufacturing  sector, i.e., that unions do affect wages  positively,  which is also in
line with our previous findings. From the t-tests of equality of  coefficients across
quantiles  in Appendix  D, we note that the hypothesis  of equal coefficients  is rejected  for
several of the variables. Once again, this points towards the appropriateness  of the
quantile  regression  approach.
6. Conclusion
This paper analyzes  the earnings  determinants  in Ghanaian  manufacturing,  focussing  on
the impact of unions and the possible asymmetries  of this impact across the earnings
distribution.  The channels through which we conjecture a potential union effect are
twofold. First, we propose a direct effect through  individual  union membership.  This is
the standard "union premium" well known from the empirical literature on unions.
However,  this does not take into account  the possible spillover  effects  to wages of non-
union members. To incorporate a  potential spillover effect, we allow unionism to
potentially  affect all workers,  including  a sectoral  union density  variable.  In addition,  we
examine  whether  there may be an additional  union  effect coming  through  via training,  as
proposed  by, e.g., Booth and Chatterji  (1998) and Booth, Zoega  and Francesconi  (1999),
since the union may promote training  to a degree over and above that of management,
due to, for example,  unions having  a longer time horizon than management,  which may
merely  maximize  profits  and stock  values in the short term. We conjecture  that the union
effects are more likely to be present at the lower to medium quantiles of the earnings
distribution,  since  unions  are generally  seen as - and increasingly  perceive  themselves  as
- proponents  of workers' rights  and earnings  mainly  for the poorer part of workers.  Such
a view would also be in line with previous  research,  which generally  finds that unions
reduce income inequality and reduce wage discrimination,  Panagides and Patrinos
(1994).
While being of  academic interest due to  the  relative skewness in  earnings
determinants  studies since the majority of studies concem developed  economies, and
furthermore do so for the entire wage distribution,  there are important policy issues
Note that while a two-sided  test fails  to reject equality,  this does  not take into  account  that  we really are
interested  in the one-sided  alternative,  which,  thus, is the one we use (and  which  also  yields more  power).
24involved as well. Indeed, if unions affect wages positively, through the channels defi-ned
and  discussed above, unions may promote a  positive  environment by affecting labor
turnover and wage negotiation costs adversely, as well as promoting worker training,
increased worker benefits and higher productivity, see Standing (1992).
The main finding of the paper is a finding of distinct asymmetries in the effects of
unions across the wage distribution of workers. The findings are consistent with a prior
belief that unions mainly bargain on behalf of the workers at the lower end of the wage
distribution. Further, we find, in addition to a direct union premium related to individual
union membership an additional spillover effect to non-union and union members alike,
coming through via the degree of unionization of the sector. Lastly, we find an additional
indirect  union  effect  coming  through  via  training,  interpretable  as  unions  either
promoting training and/or being able to bargain and subsequently share some of the rents
obtained by firms  with their members. While unions  generally have only a short  and
controversial history  in  Sub-Saharan Africa,  due  to  the  continent relying heavily  on
smallholder agriculture combined with unions often being prohibited, the findings of this
study indicate a role for unions in Ghana as being an effective "voice" for workers, and,
possibly, also as promoting training  and efficiency in  terms of lowering turnover and
negotiation costs between workers and management (the data does not allow a rigorous
investigation of this latter issue, however). Lastly, evaluating the non-union sub-sample
using the estimated union wage structure, i.e., "as if'  it was unionized, further establishes
the  presence  of  structural  differences  between  the  union  and  non-union  part  of  the
Ghanaian manufacturing industry in that, for given characteristics, a worker in the union
sector earns more than a worker in the non-union sector. In combination, the sum of our
findings implies  the  existence of  structural  differences  between the  union  and  non-
unionized  segments  of  the  manufacturing  sector,  i.e.,  that  unions  do  affect  wages
positively.
While this study establishes important channels through which unions affect wages
of manufacturing workers in Ghana, further research is required to shed additional light
on the economic effects of unions. Do unions generate the rents that are subsequently
awarded to  union  members  through  increased  wages  via  adversely  affecting  labor
turnover, wage negotiation cost and increasing productivity, or do they merely act as a
"voice" of the union members via their bargaining power, thus extracting already existing
25rents from the firm, rents that the workers could not obtain a share of on their own? In
particular, while some evidence seems to suggest that union workers are more productive
than their non-union colleagues in manufacturing in general, see Sapsford and Tzannatos
(1993), this  has not,  to  our knowledge, been adequately investigated  for the case of
Ghana. This would be an interesting avenue for further research.
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Defimitions  of Variables
Log Wages:  Log monthly wages of individual
Age:  Age of individual
Age squared:  Age of individual squared
Female:  1 if female, zero otherwise
Education:
Dummy variables for highest level of education completed of individual: 1 if as stated
below, zero otherwise ("No completed education" is reference group):
Primary:  Primary Education
Middle:  Middle Education
Secondary:  Secondary School
Vocational:  Vocational Education
Polytechnic:  Polytechnic or Technical Education
Professional:  Professional Education
University:  University
Occupation:
Dummy variables for occupation of individual:  1 if as stated below, zero otherwise
("Production worker" is reference group):
Administration:  Administrative Staff
Commercial:  Commercial and Sales Staff
Professional:  Professional Staff (Accountants, etc)
Support:  Support Staff
Manager:  Managerial Staff
Accra:  1 if Living in Accra, Zero otherwise
Firm Size:  log of the number of employees of the establishment
Sector:
Dummy variables for sector of the firm:  1 if as stated below, zero otherwise ("Wood" is
reference group):
Metal:  Metals Sector
Textile:  Textile and Garments Sector
Food:  Food Sector
Tenure (years):  Years of tenure in the firm
Tenure squared:  Years of tenure in the firm squared
Training:  1 if the individual has been trained in the firm, zero otherwise
Tenure*training:  Interaction of Tenure and Training
Permanent:  1 if the worker has a permanent contract, zero otherwise
Pernanent*training:  Interaction of Permanent and Training
Union density (sector): The fraction of the firms in sectors that have at least one
organized worker
Union density*Training:  Interaction of Union density and Training
Union membership: 1 if individaul is member of a union, zero otherwise
Union membership*Training: Interaction of Union membership and Training
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Mean Sample Characteristics
Full  Sample  Non-Union  Sub-sample  Union  Sub-sample  Mann-Whitney
(683  observations)  (347 observations)  (336 observations)  Test Statistic
Variable  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard
Deviation  Deviation  Deviation
Log  wages  10.59  0.80  10.37  0.88  10.82  0.64  -9.327
Age  34.69  11.29  32.95  12.04  36.50  10.17  -5.746
Female  0.19  0.39  0.23  0.42  0.15  0.35  2.826
Education:
Primnary  0.03  0.17  0.05  0.22  0.01  0.09  3.248
Middle  0.49  0.50  0.54  0.50  0.44  0.50  2.724
Secondary  0.12  0.33  0.13  0.34  0.11  0.32  0.774
Vocational  0.13  0.33  0.08  0.27  0.17  0.38  -3.618
Polytechnic  0.09  0.28  0.06  0.23  0.12  0.33  -3.103
Professional  0.03  0.18  0.02  0.15  0.05  0.21  -1.562
University  0.02  0.12  0.01  0.09  0.02  0.14  -1.325
Occupation:
Production  worker  0,52  0.50  0.63  0.49  0.42  0.49  5.455
Administration  0.13  0.34  0.09  0.29  0.17  0.38  -3.230
Commercial  0.07  0.25  0.06  0.23  0.08  0.27  -1.029
Professional  0.04  0.20  0.03  0.18  0.05  0.21  -1.067
Support  0.12  0.33  0.12  0.32  0.13  0.34  -0.508
Manager  0.12  0.32  0.08  0.27  0.16  0.37  -3.111
Accra  0.62  0.49  0.58  0.50  0.66  0.48  -2.185
Firm Size  3.74  1.19  3.18  1.14  4.31  0.94  -13.335
Wood  0.14  0.35  0.18  0.38  0.11  0.31  2.568
Metal  0.32  0.47  0.29  0.46  0.35  0.48  -1.518
Textile  0.27  0.44  0.23  0.42  0.30  0.46  -2.072
Food  0.27  0.45  0.30  0.46  0.24  0.43  1.633
Tenure  (years)  6.61  6.64  5.26  6.01  8.00  6.98  -6.294
Permanent  0.98  0.15  0.97  0.18  0.99  0.09  -2.285
Training  0.31  0.46  0.39  0.49  0.23  0.42  4.436
Union  membership  0.30  0.46  0.00  0.00  0.60  0.49  --
Notes: The Mann-Whitney  test is a test of equality  of the distributions  of the variable  in question  between
union and non-union  subsamples.  Bold: Statistically  significant  at 1  percent;  underline:  Statistically
significant  at 5 percent;  cursive: Statistically  significant  at 10 percent.
Source: Authors'  calculations  from  RPED III for Ghana  (1994).
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Quantile and OLS Earnings Results for Full Sample
Quantile  Regressions  OLS
0.10  0.50  0.90
Variable  Coeff.  Std.err.  Coeff.  Std.eff.  Coeff.  Std.err.  Coeff.  Std.err.
Age  0.022  0.015  0.030  0.018  0.020  0.019  0.036  0.014
Age squared  -0.000.  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000
Female  -0.029  0.093  -0.216  0.067  -0.246  0.133  -0.116  0.069
Education:
Primary  -0.188  0.214  0.203  0.264  0.647  0.580  0.441  0.161
Middle  0.036  0.145  0.046  0.102  0.208  0.111  0.234  0.090
Secondary  0.040  0.169  0.097  0.101  0.496  0.182  0.336  0.115
Vocational  0.021  0.200  0.227  0.097  0.369  0.180  0.383  0.115
Polytechnic  0.286  0.188  0.348  0.106  0.686  0.180  0.553  0.124
Professional  0.440  0.221  0.765  0.216  0.798  0.226  0.796  0.173
University  0.574  0.469  1.004  0.345  1.597  0.412  1.251  0.236
Occupation:
Administration  0.204  0.119  0.273  0.064  0.394  0.180  0.197  0.085
Commercial  0.198  0.121  0.162  0.094  0.329  0.144  0.252  0.104
Professional  0.777  0.154  0.582  0.202  0.509  0.256  0.459  0.147
Support  -0.055  0.122  -0.143  0.062  -0.137  0.107  -0.220  0.081
Manager  0.347  0.096  0.388  0.102  0.574  0.169  0.391  0.088
Accra  0.213  0.080  0.079  0.050  0.004  0.084  -0.010  0.053
Firm Size  0.124  0.034  0.110  0.027  0.126  0.046  0.126  0.024
Tenure (years)  0.021  0.018  0.014  0.011  0.006  0.025  -0.010  0.011
Tenure squared  -0.001  0.001  -0.000  0.001  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.000
Tenure*training  -0.002  0.013  -0.000  0.008  -0.000  0.014  -0.002  0.009
Permanent  0.359  0.302  -0.367  0.291  -0.117  0.149  -0.004  0.219
Permanent*training  -0.436  0.386  0.596  0.357  0.650  0.239  0.150  0.3427
Training  -0.070  0.389  -0.821  0.353  -0.843  0.265  -0.386  0.340
Union density (sector)  -0.245  0.705  0.575  0.549  0.384  1.161  0.386  0.546
Union density*  0.739  0.257  0.656  0.205  0.642  0.358  0.505  0.210
Training
Union membership  0.156  0.078  0.071  0.049  -0.051  0.114  0.014  0.068
Union membership*  0.427  0.174  0.122  0.090  0.028  0.169  0.150  0.126
Training
Constant  8.394  0.436  9.254  0.394  9.628  0.551  8.766  0.368
R'  0.36  0.32  0.33  0.39
Note: Number of observations = 683, R2 is pseudo-R 2 for the quantile regressions and adjusted R 2 for the
OLS-regression, OLS-regression: F(27, 655) = 17.4, Prob > F = 0.000. The educational reference group is
"no completed education". The occupational reference category is "production worker". Bold: Statistically
significant at I percent; underline: Statistically significant at 5 percent; curstve: Statistically significant at
10 percent.
Source: Regional Program on Enterprise Development for Ghana (Wave III, 1994).
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Quantile and OLS Earnings Results for Non-unionized Firms Only
Quantile  Regressions  OLS
0.10  0.50  0.90
Variable  Coeff.  Std.err.  Coeff.  Std.err.  Coeff.  Std.err.  Coeff.  Std.err.
Age  0.014  0.030  0.048  0.029  0.037  0.034  0.025  0.021
Age squared  -8.8e-5  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000
Female  -0.337  0.135  -0.254  0.117  -0.306  0.256  -0.280  0.114
Education:
Primary  0.229  0.319  0.579  0.265  1.229  0.656  0.480  0.218
Middle  0.192  0.219  0.013  0.108  0.265  0.172  0.269  0.141
Secondary  0.028  0.263  -0.062  0.203  0.204  0.212  0.116  0.184
Vocational  0.257  0.310  0.117  0.162  0.372  0.576  0.467  0.194
Polytechnic  0.412  0.425  0.208  0.211  0.733  0.309  0.474  0.227
Professional  0.874  0.395  0.401  0.342  1.641  0.704  0.823  0.340
University  1.285  0.706  1.185  0.767  2.025  0.760  1.635  0.475
Occupation:
Administration  0.557  0.262  0.498  0.170  0.575  0.387  0.603  0.168
Commercial  0.619  0.197  0.268  0.129  0.018  0.259  0.487  0.190
Professional  0.706  0.380  0.867  0.476  -0.387  0.928  0.448  0.293
Support  -0.083  0.227  -0.092  0.141  -0.474  0.145  -0.338  0.138
Manager  0.507  0.165  0.481  0.149  0.079  0.215  0.368  0.159
Accra  0.197  0.155  0.108  0.097  0.190  0.152  0.004  0.090
Firm Size  0.161  0.052  0.065  0.043  0.050  0.077  0.079  0.041
Metal  0.013  0.187  0.206  0.112  -0.309  0.376  -0.09  0.132
Textile  0.235  0.162  0.280  0.095  -0.053  0.339  0.139  0.129
Food  0.009  0.150  0.158  0.132  -0.084  0.363  0.103  0.130
Tenure (years)  -0.009  0.034  -0.016  0.023  -0.067  0.062  .0.023  0.022
Tenure squared  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.007  0.004  0.002  0.001
Tenure*training  -0.008  0.028  0.008  0.015  0.023  0.057  0.001  0.018
Permanent  0.137  0.366  -0.213  0.183  0.234  0.251  -0.069  0.292
Permanent*  -0.215  0.455  0.241  0.345  0.441  0.416  0.438  0.448
Training
Training  0.079  0.448  -0.434  0.326  -0.708  0.423  -0.548  0.443
Constant  8.384  0.679  9.149  0.532  9.649  .676  9.316  0.487
R2  0.35  0.30  0.31  0.33
Note: Number of observations = 347, R2 is pseudo-R' for the quantile regressions and adjusted R2 for the
OLS-regression, OLS-regression: F(26, 320) = 7.51, Prob > F = 0.000. The educational reference group is
"no completed education". The occupational reference category is "production worker". Bold: Statistically
significant at 1 percent; underline: Statistically significant at 5 percent; cursive: Statistically significant at
10 percent.
Source: Regional Program on Enterprise Development for Ghana (Wave III, 1994).
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Quantile and OLS Earnings Results for Unionized Firms Only
Quantile  Regressions  OLS  Marginal
0.10  0.50  0.90  Contribution
Variable  Coeff.  Std.err.  Coeff.  Std.err.  Coeff.  Std.err.  Coeff.  Std.err.  (OLS)-
(u  - P3nO)X
Age  0.074  0.037  0.034  0.028  0.033  0.025  0.051  0.017  0.902
Age squared  -0.001  0.001  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -1.331
Female  0.052  0.134  -0.193  0.099  -0.147  0.130  -0.033  0.086  0.047
Education:
Primary  0.121  0.401  0.268  0.414  0.046  0.442  -0.017  0.309  -0.015
Middle  0.138  0.198  0.205  0.114  0.330  0.107  0.239  0.111  -0.015
Secondary  0.383  0.231  0.485  0.154  0.955  0.298  0.574  0.140  0.056
Vocational  0.331  0.261  0.425  0.150  0.453  0.146  0.377  0.132  -0.011
Polytechnic  0.474  0.244  0.492  0.141  0.704  0.210  0.592  0.137  0.010
Professional  0.581  0.306  1.103  0.290  1.149  0.259  0.837  0.175  0.001
University  0.079  0.567  1.220  0.490  1.905  0.519  1.129  0.232  -0.007
Occupation:
Administration  0.102  0.178  0.104  0.092  0.330  0.171  0.117  0.090  -0.063
Commercial  0.243  0.206  0.210  0.118  0.282  0.140  0.164  0.110  -0.022
Professional  0.647  0.203  0.349  0.202  0.645  0.272  0.448  0.151  0.000
Support  -0.070  0.132  0.082  0.085  0.118  0.128  -0.001  0.090  0.041
Manager  0.329  0.184  0.349  0.148  0.655  0.187  0.463  0.096  0.011
Accra  0.124  0.172  0.037  0.086  0.175  0.106  0.056  0.072  0.032
Firm Size  0.068  0.055  0.146  0.038  0.083  0.046  0.114  0.034  0.131
Metal  0.190  0.258  0.163  0.089  0.300  0.130  0.238  0.102  0.105
Textile  0.060  0.252  0.095  0.112  0.449  0.193  0.179  0.113  0.011
Food  0.106  0.305  0.211  0.105  0.384  0.161  0.235  0.117  0.036
Tenure (years)  0.002  0.025  0.015  0.016  -0.000  0.020  0.005  0.013  0.185
Tenure squared  -0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  -3.5e-5  0.001  -0.179
Tenure*training  0.018  0.015  0.006  0.011  0.000  0.013  0.005  0.009  0.008
Permanent  0.473  0.284  0.535  0.255  1.484  0.511  0.804  0.361  0.854
Permanent*  -0.786  0.436  -0.227  0.266  -0.523  0.424  -0.538  0.610  -0.293
training
Training  0.707  0.392  0.170  0.254  0.500  0.401  0.498  0.607  0.323
Constant  7.504  0.703  8.243  0.526  7.514  0.688  7.626  0.501  -1.690
Note: Number of observations = 336, R2 is pseudo-R2 for the quantile regressions and adjusted R 2 for the
OLS-regression, OLS-regression: F(26, 309) = 10.46, Prob > F = 0.000. The educational reference group is
"no completed education". The occupational reference category is "production worker". Bold: Statistically
significant at I percent; underline: Statistically significant at 5 percent; cursive: Statistically significant at
10 percent.
Source: Regional Program on Enterprise Development for Ghana (Wave III, 1994).
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Test of Equality of Coefficients Across Quantiles
Full Sample  Non-Union Subsample  Union Subsample
Variable/Quantile  Qo0./Qo.5  Qo.l/Qo.9  Qos/Qo.9 Qo.i/Qo.s  Qo0./Qo.9  Qo.s/Qo.9  Qo.i/Qo.s Qo.1/Qo.9  Qo.s/Qo.9
Age  0.14  0.01  0.20  1.06  0.36  0.10  1.30  0.98  0.00
Age squared  0.01  0.18  0.12  1.05  0.37  0.13  1.17  1.23  0.05
Female  2.93  1.99  0.05  0.28  0.01  0.05  3.35  1.29  0.10
Education:
Primary  1.75  1.87  0.64  0.94  1.88  1.10  0.10  0.02  0.31
Middle  0.00  0.91  1.79  0.69  0.07  1.84  0.13  0.90  0.87
Secondary  0.10  3.48  4.21  0.09  0.30  1.09  0.19  2.61  2.28
Vocational  1.09  1.59  0.63  0.20  0.03  0.21  0.12  0.19  0.03
Polytechnic  0.10  2.60  3.37  0.27  0.41  2.61  0.01  0.62  0.83
Professional  1.47  1.29  0.01  1.27  0.95  2.89  1.89  2.32  0.03
University  0.79  2.72  1.71  0.02  0.70  1.39  3.67  5.86  1.57
Occupation:
Administration  0.38  0.88  0.47  0.00  0.05  0.04  0.00  0.97  1.77
Commercial  0.07  0.56  1.23  2.54  3.36  1.05  0.03  0.03  0.21
Professional  0.88  0.90  0.07  0.10  1.19  1.73  1.39  0.00  1.06
Support  0.52  0.29  0.00  0.00  2.08  4.44  1.24  1.13  0.07
Manager  0.11  1.58  1.22  0.02  2.82  2.98  0.01  1.68  2.20
Accra  2.34  3.53  0.75  0.33  0.00  0.28  0.30  0.07  1.40
Firm Size  0.15  0.00  0.13  2.83  1.62  0.04  1.81  0.05  1.49
Metal  - - - 0.95  0.61  1.88  0.01  0.16  0.89
Textile  - - - 0.08  0.64  1.02  0.02  1.59  3.02
Food  - - - 0.77  0.06  0.42  0.12  0.66  0.99
Tenure (years)  0.12  0.22  0.09  0.04  0.68  0.77  0.23  0.01  0.50
Tenure squared  0.26  0.18  0.05  0.00  2.62  3.06  0.08  0.20  0.12
Tenure*training  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.25  0.19  0.06  0.58  0.91  0.17
Pernanent  3.94  1.99  0.73  0.89  0.06  2.75  2.35  4.59  2.60
Permanent*Training  5.70.  6.35  0.02  0.85  1.27  0.19  0.58  0.43  0.00
Training  2.96  2.97  0.00  1.12  1.78  0.39  0.67  0.36  0.00
Union density  1.23  0.23  0.03  - - - - - -
(sector)
Union density*  0.11  0.07  0.00  - - - - - -
Training
Union membership  1.08  2.53  1.24  - - - - - -
Union membership*  3.08  3.10  0.29  - - - - - -
Training
Constant  2.95  3.45  0.48  1.02  2.02  0.49  0.34  0.00  0.38
Note: Tests are one-sided t-tests, Ho:  coefficient(Q;) = coefficient(Qj), ij=0. 1, 0.5, 0.9; Bold: Statistically
significant at 1 percent; underline: Statistically significant at 5 percent; cursive: Statistically significant at
10 percent.
Source: Regional Program on Enterprise Development for Ghana (Wave III, 1994).
35Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2554  Administrative Costs and the  Estelle James  February 2001  A. Yaptenco
Organization of Individual  James Smalhout  31823
Retirement Account Systems:  Dimitri Vittas
A Comparative Perspective
WPS2555  Implicit Pension Debt, Transition  Yan Wang  February 2001  A. Datoloum
Cost, Options, and Impact of  Dianqing Xu  36334
China's Pension Reform:  Zhi Wang
A Computable General Equilibrium  Fan Zhai
Analysis
WPS2556  Household Strategies for Coping with  Michael M. Lokshin  February 2001  P. Sader
Poverty and Social Exclusion in  Ruslan Yemtsov  33902
Post-Crisis  Russia
WPS2557  Decentralization and Accountability:  Stuti Khemani  February 2001  H. Sladovich
Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than  37698
in National Elections?
WPS2558  Growth, Inequality, and Poverty:  Martin Ravallion  February 2001  P. Sader
Looking beyond Averages  33902
WPS2559  Deposit Insurance as Private Club:  Thorsten Beck  February 2001  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Is Germany a Model?  38526
WPS2560  Catastrophe Risk Management:  John D. Pollner  February 2001  J. Pollner
Using Alternative Risk Financing  30079
and Insurance Pooling Mechanisms
WPS2561  Democracy and Income Inequality:  Mark Gradstein  March 2001  P. Sader
An Empirical Analysis  Branko Milanovic  33902
Yvonne Ying
WPS2562  Decomposing World Income  Branko Milanovic  March 2001  P. Sader
Distribution: Does the World Have a  Shlomo Yitzhaki  33902
Middle Class?
WPS2563  A Race to the Top? A Case Study of  Tsunehiro Otsuki  March 2001  L. Tabada
Food Safety Standards and African  John S. Wilson  36896
Exports  Mirvat Sewadeh
WPS2564  Economic Analysis of World Bank  Ayesha Yaqub Vawda  March 2001  E. James
Education Projects and Project  Peter Moock  31756
Outcomes  J. Price Gittinger
Harry Anthony Patrinos
WPS2565  Does Fiscal Decentralization Improve  David A. Robalino  March 2001  0.  Picazo
Health Outcomes? Evidence from a  Oscar F. Picazo  87954
Cross-Country Analysis  Albertus VoetbergPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2566  Convexity  and Sheepskin  Effects  Norbert  R. Schady  March  2001  T. Gomez
in the Human  Capital Earnings  32127
Function:  Recent  Evidence  for
Filipino  Men
WPS2567 Policy  Reform,  Economic  Growth,  Susmita  Dasgupta  March  2001  Y. d'Souza
and the Digital  Divide:  An  Somik  Lall  31449
Econometric  Analysis  David  Wheeler
WPS2568  Ownership  Structure  and  the  Robert  Cull  March  2001  Z. Kranzer
Temptation  to Loot:  Evidence  from  Jana Matesova  38526
Privatized  Firms  in the Czech  Mary  Shirley
Republic
WPS2569 From  Users  to Custodians:  Changing  Liz  Alden  Wily  March  2001  M. Yue
Relations  between  People  and  the  Peter-A.  Dewees  34102
State  in Forest  Management  in Tanzania